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ABSTRACT
International law prohibits intervention in the domestic affairs of
other states. But this prohibition, which is once again in the news in
connection with the crisis in Venezuela, is now generally portrayed as
either so strict that it precludes common elements of foreign policy like
economic sanctions or so vague as to be meaningless. This Article
seeks to restart what once was a thoughtful debate regarding nonintervention. It traces the negotiating history of the non-intervention
norm in an effort to understand why some states have characterized it
as clear in its stringency. And it unpacks the crucial concept of
“coercion” to show that those states that see non-intervention as
difficult to apply stand on solid ground. Throughout, the Article takes
a broad, comparative approach, looking to analogies in domestic law
and other areas of international law to try to explain how we got to
where we are today. The Article concludes by applying the “rules”
versus “standards” dichotomy to sketch a potential path forward—a
reframing of the prohibition of intervention as more standard-like.
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INTRODUCTION

Intervention is in the news. During a recent meeting of the UN
Security Council to discuss the situation in Venezuela, Russia accused
the United States of “flagrant . . . interference in the internal affairs of
another State.” 1 The United States responded that “[t]his discussion in
the Security Council is about the right of the Venezuelan people to
direct their own internal affairs,” 2 crystalizing a sharp disagreement
regarding who should be entitled to go about their affairs without
interference – the state or its people?
But this dispute is not the only controversy. There has been much
debate regarding actual and asserted “intervention by propaganda,”
from Russian meddling via social media in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, 3 to efforts to combat the alleged political activities of foreign
1. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8452th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.8452, at 12 (Jan. 26, 2019).
Russia later made the pointed jibe, “How would [France] feel if the Russian Federation proposed
discussing in the Security Council the issue of . . . the protests staged by the gilets jaunes,” id.
at 19, likening the situation in Venezuela to the situation in France to suggest that neither
warranted international scrutiny.
2. Id. at 25. It bears noting that the United States has also invoked the principle of nonintervention to reject scrutiny of its own policies. See, e.g., President Donald Trump, President
of the U.S., Remarks to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25,
2018) (citing the Monroe Doctrine and noting that the U.S. “reject[s] the interference of foreign
nations in this hemisphere and in our own affairs”).
3. Cf. Patrick Tucker, Did Russia’ Election Meddling Break International Law? Experts
Can’t Agree, DEFENSE ONE (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/02/
did-russias-election-meddling-break-international-law-experts-cant-agree/135255
[https://perma.cc/PS4D-97DV]. Ido Kilovaty has analyzed Russia’s meddling under the rubric
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funded non-governmental organizations, 4 to the role Al Jazeera has
played in the spat between Qatar and other gulf states. 5 The same is
true of so-called “diplomatic intervention,” in the sense of diplomatic
measures, such as suspension of membership in an international
organization, meant to be responsive to troubling actions by a state. 6
There have even reportedly been efforts to negotiate something of a
non-intervention pact. 7
That intervention is prohibited by international law is now of
course taken as well-established. But how to define intervention has
bedeviled states and scholars for equally long. 8 For instance, states
of the cyber concept of “doxing” and argued that while not coercive, such actions should be
considered intervention where they are “highly disruptive.” See Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare:
Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on Non-Intervention in the Era of
Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 146, 174 (2018).
4. Cf. Russia’s Putin signs ‘foreign agents’ media law, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-media-restrictions/russias-putin-signs-foreignagents-media-law-idUSKBN1DP0I2 [https://perma.cc/PRC7-XLFE]. For the avoidance of
doubt, my own view is that there is no colorable argument that funding an NGO constitutes
intervention.
5. Tamara Qiblawi & Larry Register, Qatar told to close Al Jazeera, reduce Iran ties in
list of demands, CNN (July 27, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/23/middleeast/gulfnations-qatar-demands/index.html [https://perma.cc/W6V8-UF8E] (demanding that Qatar “stop
interfering”); cf. Alexandra Hofer & Luca Ferro, Sanctioning Qatar: Coercive Interference in
the State’s Domaine Reserve, EJIL: TALK! (June 30, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/
sanctioning-qatar-coercive-interference-in-the-states-domaine-reserve [https://perma.cc/YBK
2-MYKQ] (noting that Qatar appeared to assert that GCC demands constituted intervention).
6. Here again, Venezuela has figured prominently. For instance, in 2017, the
MERCOSUR trade bloc suspended Venezuela. See Silvio Cascione, Mercosur suspends
Venezuela, urges immediate transition, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-venezuela-politics-mercosur/mercosur-suspends-venezuela-urges-immediatetransition-idUSKBN1AL0IB [https://perma.cc/H3CM-FFGA]; see also Declaracion de Lima,
Declaracion Conjunta 007-17, MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (Aug. 8, 2017)
http://www.rree.gob.pe/SitePages/declaracion_conjunta.aspx?id=DC-007-17
[https://perma.cc/M6JY-LDZ5] (a group of Latin American states indicating that they would not
support Venezuelan candidacies). And more recently, members of the Lima Group have
indicated that they may bar Venezuelan officials from their territories. See Lima group
declaration, GOV’T OF CANADA (Jan. 4, 2019), https://international.gc.ca/worldmonde/international_relations-relations_internationales/latin_america-amerique_latine/201901-04-lima_group-groupe_lima.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/F3TJ-B49U].
7. See John Hudson, NO DEAL: How Secret Talks with Russia to Prevent Election
Meddling Collapsed, BUZZFEED (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/johnhudson/nodeal-how-secret-talks-with-russia-to-prevent-election?utm_term=.qrqeaVVw0#.xa8QL664l
[https://perma.cc/X7KZ-N2RJ].
8. See Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 LEIDEN
J. OF INT’L L. 345, 345 & n.1 (2009); Duncan Hollis, The Influence of War; The War for
Influence, 32 TEMPLE INT’L COMP. L.J. 1, 10 (2018) (“The problem lies not in the rule’s
existence but in its application.”); Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the
Principle of Non-Intervention, at 8 (May 5, 2014) (“[C]ommentators and jurists have struggled
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have frequently argued about the extent (if at all) to which economic
measures such as sanctions constitute intervention. 9
Two camps have emerged. Some states and scholars appear to
take the view that the boundary between unlawful intervention and
lawful conduct is susceptible of clear delimitation. 10 Those who take
this view generally focus on the kind of conduct at issue (sometimes
coupled with an inquiry into the intent of the “intervening” state).11
Others, on the other hand, assert that the prohibition of intervention is
irretrievably vague. Thus, for instance, during discussion of whether
intervention should be a crime in what ultimately became the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the United Kingdom opined
that that the concept was “lacking the necessary precision.” 12 The
United States expressed a similar view in a brief filed before the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal. 13 Likewise, Maziar Jamnejad and Michael
Wood, in an important recent article on the non-intervention principle,
have taken a jaundiced view of the principle’s clarity, pointing out that

to identify the precise contours of the principle.”), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2479609 [https://perma.cc/WTK9-U72Z].
9. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Norms Internationalization and U.S. Economic
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2001) (“Critics of unilateral sanctions have argued that
economic intervention in the affairs of foreign states . . . violate[s] public international law
principles of nonintervention and territorial jurisdiction.”).
10. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8452th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.8452, at 12 (Jan. 26,
2019); cf. Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions
Under International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 2-8 (2001). See generally infra Section
III.A.
11. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Principles of Int’l Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/6799, at 51 (1967) (discussing “the nature of the
action taken and the means employed”) [hereinafter Third Report of the Special Committee];
Int’l Grp. of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Coop. Cyber Def. Ctr. of Excellence, Tallinn
Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 321 (Michael N. Schmitt
ed., 2017) (discussing intent); see also infra Part III.A.
12. Int’l Law Comm’n, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part II) – Including the Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/448 & Add.1, at 101 (1993); see also id.
at 101 (U.S.); Rep. of the Special Comm. on Principles of Int’l Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/5746, at 146 (1964) (UK) (It would be
“unwise and unprofitable [for the Committee] to attempt to define intervention”) [hereinafter
First Report of the Special Committee]; cf. Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 8, at 366 (citing
EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (2006)) (discussing Dutch views on the non-intervention provision in
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
13. Statement of Defense of the United States, Iran v. United States, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.,
Case No. A/30, at 43.
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what will constitute prohibited intervention “depends upon context,
and even on the state of relations between the states concerned.” 14
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has shed little light on
where it stands. On the one hand, it has offered something of a
definition of intervention, stating that it is an action (1) “us[ing]
methods of coercion”; and (2) bearing on “matters which each State is
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.” 15
And it has suggested that there are categories of action that are not
intervention. 16 At the same time, it has not defined “coercion” and has
appeared to leave open the possibility of taking a case-by-case
approach to assessing whether economic measures might constitute
intervention. 17
Nor is the story only one of differences of view regarding how
clearly intervention is defined; there has also been little effort to update
the prohibition of intervention—at least with respect to actions below
the level of the use of force 18—since the 1970s (with the exception of
a targeted flurry of scholarship regarding cyber activities19); at the same
14. Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 8, at 367.
15. Military & Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, at 108 (June 27); see also Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (2010) (“[Intervention] is only
prohibited when it occurs in fields of State affairs which are solely the responsibility of inner
State actors, takes place through forcible or dictatorial means, and aims to impose a certain
conduct of consequence on a sovereign State.”); Fernando R. Teson, Changing Perceptions of
Domestic Jurisdiction and Intervention, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS 29-30 (Tom Farer ed., 1996) (“[T]he means of the
intervention must be coercive (although not necessarily forcible) and the ends of the intervention
must be to influence another state (by the effect of the coercion exercised) on a matter falling
under the state’s domestic jurisdiction.”); Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 8, at 347-48 (describing
intervention as when “coercive action is taken by one state to secure a change in the policies of
another,” bearing on “‘matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State
sovereignty, to decide freely’”).
16. See, e.g., Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., at 114 (“There can be no doubt that the provision
of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country . . . cannot be regarded as
unlawful intervention.”).
17. Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 8, at 371 (“What the ICJ appears to be saying in
Nicaragua is that the particular acts at issue in the case did not amount to intervention, which is
not to say that they could not in another scenario.”); cf. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 126.
18. The legality of forcible humanitarian intervention is of course one of the most hotly
debated topics in international legal literature.
19. Cf. Duncan B. Hollis, Russia and the DNC Hack: What Future for a Duty of NonIntervention?, OPINIO JURIS (July 25, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/25/russia-and-thednc-hack-a-violation-of-the-duty-of-non-intervention [https://perma.cc/YQV4-2P53]. It is also
possible that events in Venezuela will spark further thinking on the non-intervention norm. Cf.
Alonso Gurmendi, Estrada Redux: Mexico’s stance on the Venezuela Crisis and Latin America’s

1172 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

time, key, related principles in the UN Charter have undergone an
evolution. So, for instance, the concept of “enforcement action” under
the Charter 20—a term that bears some resemblance to the term
“intervention,” connoting as it does an effort to coerce—has been
debated (and defined down). 21 Likewise, there has been considerable
discussion in recent years regarding what should be deemed to
constitute a threat to international peace and security (the key term that
establishes the Security Council’s jurisdiction to impose binding
measures), 22 while the related concept of the “domaine réservé” (that
set of matters a “state is permitted to decide freely”) has received
considerably less recent attention. 23
This Article seeks to restart the debate on non-forcible
intervention. 24 It explains how we got to where we are today. It then
goes on to make the case for understanding the prohibition of
intervention as more “standard-like” rather than as “rule-like,” arguing
evolving understanding of non-Intervention, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 8, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/
2019/01/08/estrada-redux-mexicos-stance-on-the-venezuela-crisis-and-latin-americasevolving-understanding-of-non-intervention [https://perma.cc/WZ64-9C5E].
20. See, for example, the use of the term in Article 53 of the UN Charter. See U.N. Charter
art. 53; cf. infra note 145.
21. See Monika Hakimi, To Condone or Condemn? Regional Enforcement Actions in the
Absence of Security Council Authorization, 40 VAND J. TRANSNT’L L. 643, 650-51 (2007); cf.
Michael Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the
Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 175, 187 (1967) (asserting that “the
more recent practice has been to interpret the proviso [Article 53] more loosely”).
22. See generally Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and the New Threats to the
Peace: Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 15 (2003). For instance, the Security Council
advanced the practice in the 1990s by classifying humanitarian emergencies as threats to
international peace and security. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992); see also S.C. Pres.
Statement 2/3500 (Jan. 31, 1992); Anna Hood, Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat
to the Peace,16 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 29, 35 (2015). More recently, the Council deemed Ebola
a threat to international peace and security, see S.C. Res. 2177 (Sept. 15, 2014), and has edged
in the direction of considering the consequences of climate change a potential threat to
international peace and security; cf. Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik, The Security Council and
Climate Change – Too Hot to Handle?, EJIL TALK! (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/
author/akravik/ [https://perma.cc/Y2DW-E2BF]. In each case, there was a rich debate, both
among states and in the literature. See, for example, statements by Brazil and Colombia during
the debate following adoption of Resolution 2177. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7268th mtg. at
28, 45, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7268, (Sept. 18, 2014); see generally Hood, supra (analyzing the
debate).
23. As Mazier Jamnejad and Michael Wood have noted, there have been significant worldhistorical changes since the principle of intervention was last seriously debated. Jamnejad &
Wood, supra note 8, at 349; see also id. at 380 (describing non-intervention as an “important,
although obscure, subject”).
24. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the prohibition of the use of force should be made
more standard-like.
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that such an approach would be in keeping with a number of related
trends in international law and practice, and might help square the
circle between those who see the principle of non-intervention as rigid
and clear, and those who dismiss it as Delphic.
The Article proceeds in five parts. First, in Part II, the Article
defines the terms “standard-like” and “rule-like” and briefly sketches
the history of the non-intervention principle. Part III then pinpoints
efforts throughout that history to make the non-intervention principle
more “rule-like” and offers two potential explanations: (1) that a debate
regarding the outer limits of “force” under the UN Charter slopped over
into discussion of non-intervention; and (2) that states negotiating
seminal formulations of the principle were influenced by Latin
American jurisprudence.
The Article proceeds in Part IV to explain why non-intervention
is much harder to define than proponents of a rule-like approach would
have it, taking each element the ICJ has identified—“coercion” and
“matters the state is permitted to decide freely” (the “domaine
réservé”)—in turn. Finally, in Part V, the Article sketches an argument
in favor of understanding the prohibition of intervention as more
“standard-like” and offers thoughts on potential ways to begin such
work.
II. RULES, STANDARDS, AND THE HISTORY OF THE NONINTERVENTION PRINCIPLE
The terms “rule” and “standard” are long-standing tropes of
domestic law; but they are seldom applied at the international level,25
and so this Part will briefly sketch their contours here. The classic
example of the difference between a rule and a standard concerns how
drivers should approach a railroad crossing. The rule would have it that
a motorist must stop and look; the standard, on the other hand, would
25. Daniel Bodansky has, however, applied this lens to international environmental law,
pointing out numerous examples of both rules and standards. See generally Daniel Bodansky,
Rules Versus Standards in International Environmental Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 275
(2004). And Amichai Cohen, Duncan Hollis, and I have all applied this framework to
international humanitarian law. See generally Amichai Cohen, Rules and Standards in the
Application of International Humanitarian Law, 41 ISR. L. REV. 41 (2008); Duncan B. Hollis,
Setting the Stage: Autonomous Legal Reasoning in International Humanitarian Law, 30
TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 1, 11-12 (2016); Stephen Townley, Indiscriminate Attacks and the
Past, Present, and Future of the Rules/Standards and Objective/Subjective Debates in
International Humanitarian Law, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 1223 (2017).
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prescribe reasonableness. 26 That is, a rule is self-contained in the sense
that if certain facts are true, a decision-maker is inexorably expected to
respond in a particular way. By contrast, a standard tends to refer to an
objective (e.g., reasonableness), 27 and is much harder to assess ex ante
(because events must actually have unspooled to make the
assessment). 28 Another characteristic of a standard is that it may require
weighing a number of considerations. 29 For instance, to give examples
from international law, the ban on blinding laser weapons is a rule; on
the other hand, the question of whether an attack is imminent for
purposes of the right of self-defense is much more standard-like. 30
There are consequences to the choice between a rule and a
standard. One benefit of a rule is clarity. A standard, on the other hand,
is better suited to situations where flexibility is important, for instance
where one may not be able to foresee all eventualities. 31 On the other
hand, standards tend to “leave many issues open” 32 and leave discretion
to those that interpret them, 33 which, in the case of the prohibition of
intervention, would be states themselves. And it is to the history of how
states have defined that prohibition that this Part will now briefly turn.
The story begins in the Western Hemisphere with the 1933
Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 34 Article 8 of this
Convention provided that “[n]o state has the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another.” 35 Acceptance of the Montevideo
26. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985).
Another well-known example is how to regulate driving speed. A rule would specify a speed
limit. A standard would simply direct drivers to behave reasonably. See Bodansky, supra note
25, at 276.
27. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1687–88 (1976).
28. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559 (1992).
29. See, e.g. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and Principles,
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 6, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/09/legaltheory-lexicon-rules-standards-and-principles.html [https://perma.cc/3ZAL-K3XR] (“Whereas
a rule defines a triggering condition and a consequence, a standard may define a set of relevant
considerations and options.”).
30. Cf. Ashley Deeks, Multi-Part Tests in the Jus Ad Bellum, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1035, 1052
(2016).
31. Bodansky, supra note 25, at 278.
32. Bodansky, supra note 25, at 278.
33. Bodansky, supra note 25, at 279.
34. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097.
35. Id. art. 8; see Jose A. Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the InterAmerican System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147, 1154 n.12 (1967) (“The Montevideo . . . conference[]
codified what some authors have called the doctrine of absolute non-intervention.”).
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Convention “marked the first occasion on which the United States had
accepted the non-intervention doctrine.” 36 These provisions were then
taken up and expanded in the 1948 Charter of the Organization of
American States (“OAS”). 37 As one seminal book has put it, “under the
Charter of Bogota [OAS Convention] that general right [to “intervene”]
[was] completely abrogated, without qualification.” 38
The UN Charter, on the other hand, did not speak to the
prohibition of intervention by states. Rather, Article 2(7) of the Charter
prohibited the United Nations from intervening in matters essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of states. 39 Thus, the content of the
prohibition was left to be negotiated in the 1960s in the UN Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States, frequently called the “Friendly Relations
Declaration.” 40 The Friendly Relations Declaration ultimately provided
that “[n]o State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State.” 41
Non-intervention was then hotly debated at several other key
moments, including in the 1970s in connection with the Arab oil
embargo 42 and in the 1980s with reference to economic sanctions
imposed by Western states. 43 Ultimately, the ICJ delivered its judgment
in the Nicaragua case in 1986; but it settled little with respect to the
many areas of disagreement, and debate continued, for instance
concerning the US embargo on Cuba. 44

36. Cabranes, supra note 35, at 1153 n.12. For additional detail on why the United States
agreed to this, see Charles G. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT’L
L. 645, 656-57 (1945); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES 63 (1963); Cabranes, supra note 35, at 1159.
37. Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 19, 20, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
38. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 36, at 140; see also THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note
36, at 390; JACQUES NOEL, LE PRINCIPE DE NON-INTERVENTION: THEORIE ET PRATIQUE DANS
LES RELATIONS INTER-AMERICAINES 53 (1981).
39. See U.N. Charter art. 2(7); cf. BRUNO SIMMA ET AL., EDS., 1 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 284 (2012) (“According to its text, Art. 2(7) protects only
against acts of the UN and not against acts of other states.”).
40. G.A. Res. 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States (Oct. 24, 1970).
41. Id.
42. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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III. THE DESIRE FOR A NON-INTERVENTION “RULE”
This Part seeks first to show how states (or at least a group of
states) have sought time and again throughout this history to
characterize the non-intervention principle as rule-like. The sections
that follow then offer potential explanations for these efforts.
A.

Non-Intervention as a Rule

States that see the principle of non-intervention as clear have
generally taken one or both of two views—that certain actions can be
defined in advance as constituting violations of the principle 45 or that
what matters is the “intervening” state’s intention. 46 Both of these are
rule-like in the sense that the triggering condition for deeming an action
“intervention” can be defined ex ante. (An intention-based approach
may still be rule-like, even if it is subjective rather than objective.)
45. Thus, for instance, as early as the 1950s, states sought within the OAS to propound a
list of forbidden actions. See PAN-AMERICAN UNION, INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL
COMMITTEE, INSTRUMENT RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTEVENTION
16-17 (1959), available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112102430321;view=
1up;seq=11[https://perma.cc/RKS8-RZ5G]. At the time, the elaboration of this instrument was
explicitly recognized as an effort to make non-intervention rather more rule-like. See Id. at 22
(views of U.S. member); see also Stanley Hoffman, The problem of Intervention, in
INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 7, 9 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) (“One [way to define
intervention] is by reference to the type of activity involved.”).
46. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 10 (arguing that “[t]he most important delimitation is …
by type of target,” which would necessarily entail understanding intent); Kilovaty, supra note 3,
at 173 (“Intent is already considered by many to be a constitutive element of the norm on nonintervention.”); cf U.N. Secretary-General, Economic Measures as a Means of Political and
Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. A/48/535 (Oct. 25, 1993) (“The
specific intent of the country imposing the measures is the most important criteria.”). Traces of
such an approach can also be found in early General Assembly products. Thus, for instance,
Resolution 290 of 1949 called upon states to “refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect,
aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State. . . .” See U.N. Res. 290
(IV) (Dec. 1, 1949) (emphasis added). OAS instruments on intervention also had a purpose
component. See generally Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Non-Intervention by a State in the Internal or
External Affairs of Another Slate, in 157 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 252, 257 (1977). There is some logic to such an approach, insofar as it
has a parallel in jurisprudence regarding the prohibition of threats of force, which the ICJ has
suggested must be intended to be coercive. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment,
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); see also NIKOLAS STURCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (2007) (“To qualify as a violation of article 2(4), the British mission
would have needed to exert political pressure on Albania.”). On the other hand, there could be
some difficulty in reconciling such an approach with the ICJ’s jurisprudence regarding the use
of force. See Marcelo Kohen, The Principle of Non-Intervention 25 Years After the Nicaragua
Judgement, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2012) (“The fact that it was not the intention of
Uganda to overthrow the incumbent Congolese government was beside the point.”).
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So, for example, during the negotiation of the Friendly Relations
Declaration and of Resolution 2131 (the provisions of which were in
large part incorporated into the Friendly Relations Declaration), states
sought to approach the prohibition of intervention from the perspective
of categories of action, 47 with some focusing on economic
intervention, 48 others on propaganda, 49 others on diplomatic
relations, 50 and yet others on what was then called “indirect
intervention,” e.g., support to opposition movements in third states. 51
47. See Third Report of the Special Committee, supra note 11, at 53 (one representative
arguing for “a list of situations which must be presumed to be brought about by intervention.”);
see also U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1397th mtg. at 258, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1397
(Dec. 6, 1965) (statement in First Committee, where Resolution 2131 was negotiated, referring
to Mexican views expressed during meetings of the Special Committee); Third Report of the
Special Committee, supra note 11, at 113-14. See generally Myres S. McDouglal & Florentino
P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles of the
Law of War, 67 YALE L. J. 771, 792 (1958) (distinguishing military, economic, diplomatic and
ideological categories of action); cf. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study of
Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 PENN. L. REV. 993, 989,
993 (1974) (adopting a similar three categories but noting that they would need to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis to determine legality).
48. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1405th mtg. at 315 (Jordan), U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/SR.1405 (Dec. 9, 1965) (“Economic pressure was another form of intervention.”); U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1401st mtg. at 284 (Alg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1401 (Dec. 8,
1965) (“Political intervention often took the form of economic assistance.”); see also Special
Comm. on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States, Systematic Summary of the Comments, Statements, Proposals and Suggestions
of Member States in Respect of the Consideration by the General Assembly of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, at 90 (comments of Thailand and Cuba),
U.N. Doc. A/AC.119/L.1 (June 24, 1964).
49. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1404th mtg. at 308 (Isr.), U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/SR.1404 (Dec. 9, 1965) (suggesting that the misuse of radio “constituted a means of
indirect intervention”); U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1401st mtg. at 287 (Uru.), U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/SR.1401 (Dec. 8, 1965) (“[E]conomic intervention [was] the practice of financing
political parties and the Press, radio and television in foreign countries and infiltrating their
educational means.”); U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,1st Comm., 1400th mtg., at 275-76 (Guinea) U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/SR.1400 (Dec. 7, 1965) (discussing “poisoning the minds of the people of a
sovereign and peaceful country by the use of the modern information media”); U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1395th mtg. at 246 (Colom.), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1395 (Dec. 3, 1965)
(discussing “resorting to propaganda”).
50. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1405th mtg. at 316 (Bulg.) , U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/SR.1405 (Dec. 9, 1965) (“The ‘Hallstein doctrine’ . . . was a way of exerting political
pressure on countries that had decided to normalize their relations with the German Democratic
Republic.”); id. at 315 (Jordan) (“Yet another type of intervention was . . . pressure of all kinds
which was exerted by certain State to obtain votes.”).
51. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1398th mtg. at 261 (U.K.), U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/SR.1398 (Dec. 6, 1965) (noting that the USSR’s first draft made “no mention of
subversive activities . . . which caused as much concern to many Governments as did direct and
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At the same time, the first Latin American proposal for what
became Resolution 2131 spoke of actions “intended to impair the
sovereignty, the autonomy, the security or the political, economic and
cultural integrity of States.” 52 During the negotiation of the Friendly
Relations Declaration, the United Kingdom suggested that intervention
be defined as action taken “in order to coerce another State.” 53 (Indeed,
despite purporting to condemn intervention for any and all purposes,
the Friendly Relations Declaration includes an opaque motive
clause. 54)
States invoked these same rule-like approaches during the other
touchstone moments in the history of the non-intervention principle.
During the 1970s, in assessing the legality of the Arab oil embargo, one
advocate defended it on the basis that “it is the objective of the
measures that stands out as the most pertinent criterion for their
legitimacy.” 55 Another scholar agreed—although perhaps more as a
matter of lege ferenda rather than lex lata—stating that “[c]riteria
concerned with the motives or purposes of the accused State are likely
to be more valuable [than an effects-based test].” 56 Likewise, during
armed attack”); U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,1st Comm., 1399th mtg. at 270 (Australia), U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/SR.1399 (Dec. 7, 1965) (noting that “[a] new factor was the advocacy by Peking of what
it called ‘wars of national liberation’ in Latin America”); see also id. at 274 (Rwanda)
(discussing “subversive activities promoted from outside a country with the aim of overthrowing
its legally established institutions”).
52. U.N. Gen. Assemb., Rep. of the 1st Comm., The Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of State and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, U.N. Doc.
A/6220, at 4 (Dec. 21, 1965).
53. Third Report of the Special Committee, supra note 11, at 45; see also id. at 51 (one
state suggesting that if another state “sought or threatened to exercise that right [not to recognize
a government] in order to influence another State” it constituted intervention) (emphasis added);
Rep. of the 1966 Special Comm. on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/6230, at 70 (June 27, 1966), (“Some
representatives thought, moreover, that the legal concept of non-intervention related largely to
the intention of one State to force another State.”) [hereinafter Second Report of the Special
Committee].
54. Compare G.A. Res. 25/2625, at 5 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“No State or group of States has the
right to intervene . . . for any reason whatever.”) with id. (“No State may use or encourage the
use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain
from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages
of any kind.”) (emphasis added); cf. infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
55. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under
International Law, 68 AM. J. INT’L L. 591, 619 (1974); see also Richard B. Lillich, Economic
Coercion and the International Legal Order, 51 INT’L AFF. 358, 367 (1975) (the test “rests more
upon subjective than objective standards”).
56. Derek W. Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 245,
248 (1976); see also Tom J. Farer, Problems of an International Law of Intervention, 3 STAN. J.
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the 1980s, in connection with the debate regarding so-called “economic
coercion,” states focused on categories of action in seeking to define
intervention 57 and prominent scholars such as Oscar Schacter endorsed
proposals to enumerate those measures that would constitute prohibited
intervention in connection with a civil war. 58
Finally, during more recent debates, including regarding the Cuba
embargo, both ways of framing the rule-like-ness of the prohibition of
intervention remained on display. 59 When Cuba first brought the issue
of the US embargo to the General Assembly, it made much of the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, suggesting that its passage made clear
that the US had an unlawful objective, namely to force a change in the
Cuban political system. 60 At the same time, in reacting to Cuba’s
INT’L STUD. 20, 20 (1968) (“At a minimum, intervention involves behavior which has as its
conscious and primary objective the production of an effect in the target state.”)
57. U.N. Secretary-General, Economic Measures Taken by Developed Countries for
Coercive Purposes, Including their Impact on International Economic Relations, at 11, U.N.
Doc. A/40/596 (Oct. 16, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 SyG Report]; cf. id. at 12 (suggesting that
ultimately this would be susceptible to adjudication).
58. Oscar Schacter, The Use of Force: Self-Defense, in 178 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at 150, 162 (1982). At the same time, states also
pursued General Assembly adoption of a sequence of resolutions asserting unequivocally that
“coercive and restrictive measures . . . for exerting political pressure” “are at variance with the
Charter of the United Nations,” appearing to make reference to the question of the intervening
state’s intention. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 38/197 (1983). And an expert group convened in 1989
came to the conclusion that whether ‘economic coercion’ was lawful should turn in large part
on the intention of the ‘sending’ state, stating that “[t]here was general consensus that the intent
of the sender country was an important criterion.” U.N. Secretary-General,, Economic Measures
as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
A/44/510 (Oct. 10, 1989). For example, Argentina relied on the UK’s asserted purpose in
arguing that economic measures adopted in the wake of the Falklands dispute were unlawful.
1985 SyG Report, supra note 57, at 15 (“[T]he measures were adopted for reasons that are not
economic but strictly political”); see also id. at 21 (Bulgaria) (asserting that the U.S. embargo
against Nicaragua had as “its sole purpose . . . to serve the political goals of the administration
of the United States”); id. at 46 (Haiti) (“the use of economic sanctions for political purposes”).
59. Other rule-like tests have sometimes been advanced. For instance, some have looked
to how abruptly an action is taken. See Clive Parry, Defining Economic Coercion in
International Law, 12 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 4 (1977) (“[I]s it not again the abruptness of this thing
which is somehow objectionable?”); see also Sherrie Lipsky, Comment, The Legitimacy of
Economic Coercion: The Carter Foreign Aid Policy and Nicaragua, 5 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 101, 110 (1982) (characterizing US action vis-à-vis Nicaragua as “abrupt and without
prior notice, with devastating results”).
60. Letter Dated 6 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/654 (Nov. 10, 1992). For
another recent intention-based approach, see Steven Barela, Cross-Border Cyber Ops to Erode
Legitimacy: An Act of Coercion, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
36212/cross-border-cyber-ops-erode-legitimacy-act-coercion [https://perma.cc/4KHJ-B9E8].
See also Hofer & Ferro, supra note 5 (asserting that that intervention should be defined as
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proposed UN General Assembly resolution on the topic, a number of
states that shared Cuba’s concerns framed the issue in categorical
terms. 61
There has also long been a tendency to say that certain subjects
are either clearly within the domaine réservé or without. 62 For instance,
the principle of non-intervention has always been understood to protect
the freedom of a state to choose its political, economic, and social
system. 63 This has led both scholars and states to suggest that anything
to do with elections 64—or even political debate 65 —must be within a
state’s domaine réservé. 66
“‘abnormal’, ‘improper’ or ‘arbitrary’ interference. . . . for the sole purpose of harming or
damaging another State”) (emphasis added).
61. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. at 24 (Venezuela), U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.70 (Dec. 9, 1992)
(arguing that the “exercise [of] jurisdictional sovereignty extraterritorially is . . . inadmissible”);
id. at 28 (Mexico) (when “a country claim[s] that its legislation appli[es] to [another state’s]
trade with third countries,” that is a violation of “the principle of non-intervention.”); see also
id. at 44-45 (Tanzania).
62. See, e.g., Teson, supra note 15, at 32, 37.
63. The USSR, for instance, emphasized during negotiation of the Friendly Relations
Declaration the importance of states’ being able to choose their political system. See Special
Comm. on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States, 1st Sess., 28th mtg., at 15. See also S.C. Res. 562 (May 10, 1985) (adopted in
reaction to US economic sanctions against Nicaragua, “[r]eaffirms the sovereignty and
inalienable right of [all States] freely to decide their own political, economic and social
systems”).
64. CHATHAM HOUSE, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NON-INTERFERENCE IN A STATE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS USED TO BE A
RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: IS IT STILL? 7 (2007) (asserting that “[i]nterference in political
activities (such as through financial or other support for particular political parties or candidates,
or even perhaps comment on upcoming elections or on the candidates)” constitutes intervention),
available
at
http://studylib.net/doc/8433936/the-principle-of-non-intervention-in
[https://perma.cc/52DL-JSYE]; Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of
Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2017) (“[E]lections fall within the domaine reserve.”); cf.
also Brian Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, Remarks at Berkeley Law, 1314 (Nov. 10, 2016)(“[A] cyber operation by a State that interferes with another country’s ability
to hold an election or that manipulates another country’s election results would be a clear
violation of the rule of non-intervention.”), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-International-Law-and-Stability-in-CyberspaceBerkeley-Nov-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RPL-3MSB].
65. Cf. U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7621st mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7621 (Feb. 15, 2016)
(Russian Federation asserting that support for “Euro Maidan” movement in Ukraine constituted
intervention).
66. There is also a long-held view that there are certain inherently governmental functions
that are reserved to the territorial state. Schmitt, Grey Zones, supra note 64, at 5-6; Craig
Forcese, Pragmatism and Principle: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 67 (2016), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/
pragmatism-and-principle-intelligence-agencies-and-international-law [https://perma.cc/L7GTQQ7M]. This is generally discussed in the context of limitations on a third state’s undertaking
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But why have states assumed that non-intervention could so
readily be defined, whether by reference to the kind of action taken or
the acting state’s motive? The next Section turns to that question.
B.

The Origins of the Rule-Based Approach

This Section offers two potential explanations for this desire that
the non-intervention principle be—and indeed, widespread sense that
it is—rule-like in its clarity. First, during the 1960s and early 1970s,
there were robust debates regarding how to define force. One camp
offered a broad understanding that would have encompassed coercive
economic or political measures. 67 The other insisted that the
prohibition of the use of force be understood restrictively as concerning
only military-type action. 68 When the latter prevailed, the expansionist
camp pivoted and began to argue that the non-intervention principle
should be understood to cover the very same measures they had sought
to include within the ambit of the prohibition of the use of force. 69 Since
the prohibition of the use of force was (at least in the 1960s and

enforcement activities, Dan E. Stigall, Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the
Prohibition on Extraterritorial Enforcement Jurisdiction in International Law, 3 NOTRE DAME
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 16-17 (2013); INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 10 (2009); Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 54 (2002). But one can
assume that these functions would likewise be seen as part of the territorial state’s domaine
réservé. Cf. Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 8, at 346 (noting that the non-intervention principle
is “closely linked . . . to the international legal limits on a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe and to
enforce”). These inherently governmental functions have also tended to be delimited on a
category-by-category basis. Cf. Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental
and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227, (Sept. 12, 2011), appdx A.
67. Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law,
79 AM. J. INT’L L. 405, 408 (1985) (“[One] line of interpretation insist[ed] that Article 2(4)
outlaws any form of coercion.”).
68. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 427-29 (2011).
69. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
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1970s 70) understood as rather rule-like, 71 a presumption of clarity may
have come along for the ride when the locus of debate shifted from the
definition of force to the prohibition of intervention. The second
potential reason for the sense that the principle of non-intervention is
rule-like is that the current law of non-intervention has deep roots in
Latin American jurisprudence, where non-intervention has historically
tended to be understood in quite categorical terms. 72
These two potential reasons are of course related—in that those
states that approached the debate regarding the use of force in a rulelike way would presumably also have wished to define the prohibition
of intervention in a rule-like way, whether or not they saw some link
between the two discussions. Nevertheless, the sub-sections that
follow tease them apart in an effort at greater descriptive clarity.
1. Debates Over Article 2(4)
At the time of the negotiation of the Friendly Relations
Declaration, the debate regarding how to define “force” was hot.73
70. There have been recent debates regarding what forms of cyber activity constitute uses
of force (or armed attacks). See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and
Wartime Cyber Operations Under International Law; An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 240, 245 (2017); Waxman, supra note 68, at 431. There have also been debates
regarding whether force below a certain threshold is sufficiently de minimis to escape regulation
under the Charter (although it would still be subject to law enforcement rules). See Olivier
Corten, Regulating Resort to Force: A Response to Matthew Waxman From a ‘Bright-Liner,’
24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 191, 193 (2013); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The True Meaning of Force, 108
AJIL UNBOUND 141 (2014), available at https://www.asil.org/blogs/true-meaning-force ; Mary
Ellen O’Connell, The True Meaning of Force; A Further Response to Tom Ruys in the Interest
of Peace, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 153 (2014) (describing a “threshold”), available at
https://www.asil.org/blogs/true-meaning-force-further-response-tom-ruys-interest-peace. There
are also questions about whether there may be uses of force that do not constitute an armed
attack. Military & Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, at 101 (June 27). I do not engage here questions regarding how to understand
exceptions to the prohibition, where Matthew Waxman has posited a divide between the “brightliners” and balancers. See Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and
Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 152 (2013).
71. See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN
GEORGIA 242 (2009). Likewise, many assert that the term “armed attack” is clear. See, e.g.,
Waxman, supra note 68, at 159-60.
72. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
73. As one author has put it, the question of whether the “general principle of the illegality
of the threat or use of force include[s] economic and political pressure . . . has been [a problem]
of major concern.” Hartmut Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against
Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE
WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 17-18 (1974); Jordan J. Paust, Comment, International Law and
Economic Coercion: “Force,” the Oil Weapon and Effects Upon Prices, 3 YALE J. INT’L L. 213,
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States sought to resolve this dispute during the negotiation of Article
52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 74 but failed.75
They again sought to address this issue in the context of defining
aggression, 76 and again failed. 77 This then was the backdrop against
which the Friendly Relations Declaration was negotiated.
Czechoslovakia quickly proposed to include “economic, political
or any other form of pressure” in the definition of force. 78 Others, such
as the United Kingdom, again resisted. 79 At the same time, the initial
instinct of some states was to treat “intervention” as coextensive with
“force.” 80 So, for instance, the United States, Australia, Canada,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom submitted a proposal

214 (1976); see also J. Curtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International
law: The Case of Nicaragua, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 180 (1986).
74. Sir Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Rep on the Law of Treaties, 1819, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183 & Add. 1-4/1966 (Jan. 18, 1966) (“A number of Governments
suggest that the article should be expanded so as to make it cover other forms of pressure. . . .”).
75. During negotiation of the VCLT, the price of dropping demands to expand the
definition of force in Article 52 was adoption of a Declaration titled the “Declaration on the
Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties.” See
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Final Act of the United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/26.
76. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 6th Comm., 14571st mtg. at 42, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1471
(1974).
77. Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J.
INT’L L. 224, 224 (1977) (“The status of extreme economic coercion . . . remains as legally
problematic as ever.”)
78. See First Report of the Special Committee, supra note 12, at 84; see also id. at 84
(Yugoslavia); id. at 85 (Yugoslavia, India, Ghana). See generally Robert Rosenstock, The
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65
AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 724 (1971); Piet-Hein Houten, Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 703, 707 (1967).
79. First Report of the Special Committee, supra note 12, at 21.
80. First Report of the Special Committee, supra note 12, at 116 (“The scope of the word
‘intervention’ is indicated by the wording of Article 2, paragraph 4.”) (U.S.); Special Comm. on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States,
1st Sess., 29th mtg. at 8 (U.S.) (“State intervention . . . was dealt with only obliquely in Article
2(4).”); see also Special Comm. on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, 1st Sess., 26th mtg. at 5 (U.K.) (“The prohibition
of the use or threat of force had absorbed much of the classic conception of intervention.”). Even
states that took a broad view of the prohibition of the use of force appear at times to have equated
the prohibition of the use of force and the prohibition of intervention in terms of the character
of the acts that were prohibited. Cf. Special Comm. On Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 1st Sess., 17th mtg. at 8
(Yugoslavia) (suggesting that what mattered in distinguishing force from intervention was
whether the pressure came from without or from within a state).
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emphasizing the availability of self-defense against intervention,81
suggesting that they saw intervention as equivalent to an armed attack.
When states were again unable to reach agreement on the question
of the definition of force, those that had sought an expansive
prohibition of coercive activity took the fight to the definition of
intervention. 82 As one scholar has said, negotiators left this “to the
separate principle of non-intervention.” 83 Thus, one potential
explanation for the theology of non-intervention may be that those
states were left with the expectation that when the debate shifted from
the scope of the prohibition of the use of force to the content of the nonintervention principle, the measures with which they were concerned
would still be treated in a rule-like way.
2. Latin American History
The second potential reason why states may have come into and
away from the negotiation of the Friendly Relations Declaration
assuming that the non-intervention principle was a rule has to do with
its intellectual origins. As Gaetano Arrangio-Ruiz has trenchantly put
it, “[m]any seem[ed] to think [during the Friendly Relations
Declaration negotiation] that to question, even in part, the ‘legitimacy’
of a concept of non-intervention (as distinguished from the duty spelled
out in Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter) would constitute an
offense to the States of Latin America.” 84
Indeed, the non-intervention elements of the Friendly Relations
Declaration were drafted by Latin American states. After a first
meeting of the Special Committee that produced no agreement on the
non-intervention principle, the then-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (“U.S.S.R.”) tried an end-around, proposing a draft of what
became Resolution 2131. 85 After vituperative discussion of the
U.S.S.R. proposal, it was a group of Latin American states that
81. Second Report of the Special Committee, supra note 53, at 146-47.
82. First Report of the Special Committee supra note 12, at 121; cf. Special Comm. on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States,
1st Sess., 9th mtg. at 15 (Mex.) (suggesting that pressure was illegal but perhaps best dealt with
as a prohibited intervention).
83. Brosche, supra note 73, at 26
84. GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1979).
85. G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21,
1965).
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brokered a deal on an amended draft, 86 which then formed the basis for
the non-intervention wording of the Friendly Relations Declaration. 87
And intervention was understood in Latin America quite
broadly, 88 for instance to include non-recognition. 89 In fact, a number
of Latin American states were among those that pushed the view that
economic coercion should be considered aggression. 90 Thus, given the
way non-intervention was understood in Latin America, it is perhaps
unsurprising that some have had the sense that the prohibition of
intervention as reflected in the Friendly Relations Declaration was
likewise clear. 91
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH A RULE-BASED APPROACH
The prior Part sought to determine why some states may believe
that what the non-intervention principle prohibits can be clearly
defined; this Part explores why theirs is a fool’s errand. The sections
86. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm., 1420th mtg. at 420, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1420
(Dec. 18, 1965) (statement by Peru).
87. Some states did not support importing the language of Resolution 2131. France, for
instance, said that Resolution 2131 “should not in any circumstances be invoked as a precedent
in the Sixth Committee or in the Special Committee.” U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Comm.,
1422d mtg. at 432, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1422 (Dec. 20, 1965); see also Second Report of the
Special Committee, supra note 53, at 74.
88. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
89. Cf. NOEL, supra note 38, at 42; id. at 81 (discussing US policy toward Mexico under
Huerta).
90. Martin Domb, Defining Economic Aggression in International Law: The Possibility of
Regional Action by the Organization of American States, 11 CORNELL J. INT’L L. 85, 86-87 n.12
(1978). Ultimately, Latin American practice proved more flexible than their expressed views.
Cabranes, supra note 35, at 1173, 1175. But through at least 1965 there was a “rigid
interpretation of the of the principle of ‘non-intervention.’” LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE OAS
AND THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1977); see also Hernan Vales,
The Latin American View on the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, J. OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE
(Feb.
14,
2001),
https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1491#_ednref54
[https://perma.cc/J4UU-HD5S] (describing the events of 1965 as reflecting that “Latin
American states made for the first time a balancing test between human rights and democratic
values, on one side, and an absolute Principle of Non-intervention on the other”). More recently,
the Latin American understanding of the principle has evolved. Domingo E. Acevedo & Claudio
Grossman, The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy, in BEYOND
SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS 132, 136 (Tom
Farer ed., 1996) (suggesting that “collective action against illegitimate governments did not
constitute a violation of the principle of nonintervention”); Kathryn Sikkink, Reconceptualizing
Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
705, 716 (1997) (arguing that the non-intervention principle is not “an end value in and of itself,
but more as a means secure other desired goals”).
91. See generally supra Section III.A.
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that follow identify three problems with treating the prohibition of
intervention as a rule: first, the texts that speak to the prohibition are
inconsistent with each other; second, treating the prohibition as a rule
glosses over profound conceptual uncertainty regarding the definition
of “coercion” under international law; and third, the rule-like approach
is at odds with recent developments.
To be sure, textual inconsistencies could be a problem for a
standard too. But what makes a rule a rule is its ostensible ex ante
clarity. 92 And textual inconsistency is easier to resolve ex post, taking
into consideration the totality of the circumstances; likewise, standards
tend to require reference to extrinsic concepts (such as interpreting
reasonableness by reference to the behavior of a reasonable person),
rather than being confined to the four corners of the text. This Part turns
first to the textual inconsistencies.
A.

Textual Concerns

Put simply, the various instruments that speak to the nonintervention principle differ one from another in small but significant
ways. For instance, Article 20 of the OAS Charter provides that “[n]o
State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.” 93 Likewise,
the Friendly Relations Declaration states that “[n]o State may use or
encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures
to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of
the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of
any kind.” 94 The Helsinki Final Act, by contrast, speaks of acts
“designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another
participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty.” 95 The
“design” of an act has greater extrinsic character than the purpose of
the actor in carrying out an act.
92. See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557,
559 (1992).
93. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 20 (emphasis added).
94. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 40.
95. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act princ. VI, Aug. 1, 1975
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. The same approach is taken in the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States art.
32. I do not focus on this document given that it is not generally regarded as reflecting agreement
on legal norms. Cf. Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 8, at 354.
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But the ambiguities are greater than just the question of intent
versus character of the act: the relevant intent is also in question. Both
the OAS Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration contemplate
that the purpose of the intervention must be both to coerce and to obtain
an advantage. 96 Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz suggests that this should be
understood as a requirement that the intervention be in pursuit of an
“undue” advantage. 97 This was an argument adduced by the United
States to defend its trade measures against Nicaragua (that the intent
was not improper). 98 Likewise, a similar sense may underlie the Institut
de Droit International’s resolution suggesting that states may apply
pressure in response to violations by the “target” state of their human
rights obligations. 99 Such pressure would not be “in order to obtain an
undue advantage.”
At the same time, however, the Friendly Relations Declaration
purports to prohibit intervention “for any reason whatsoever.” 100 This
apparently all-encompassing statement is all the more striking since the
Declaration differs from Resolution 2131, on which many of the
relevant provisions of the Declaration were based, by making the
requirements of a coercive purpose and the aim of securing an
advantage conjunctive rather than disjunctive. 101 The Helsinki Final
Act offers yet another formulation of the relevant concept. 102 It refers
to the subordination of the target’s state interest “and thus” to
advantages that will inure to the acting state—appearing to assume that
any coercion will necessarily yield advantages. 103 Finally, the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States did not include the concept of

96. See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 20 (“in order to force the
sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind”); G.A. Res. 2625,
supra note 40 (“in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights
and to secure from it advantages of any kind”).
97. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Non-Intervention by a State in the Internal or External Affairs
of Another State, 157 COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 252, 263 (1977).
98. E.Y. Benneh, Economic Coercion, the Non-Intervention Principle and the Nicaragua
Case, 6 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 241 (1994).
99. Institut de Droit International, The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of
Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs of States, Session of Santiago de Campostela, art. 2 (1989).
100. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 40.
101. Compare G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 40 (“in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind”) (emphasis added) with G.A. Res. 2131
(Dec. 21, 1965) (“ . . . in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind”) (emphasis added).
102. See Helsinki Final Act, supra note 95.
103. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 95, at VI.
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securing advantages at all,104 which Richard Lillich has suggested was
intentional—that, in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, developing
states decided they might wish to have the “option of engaging in some
of the economic pressures for which they had so consistently castigated
the industrial countries.” 105 With these myriad formulations, it is hard
to argue that the definition of intervention is sufficiently clear-cut to be
a rule.
B.

Conceptual Concerns

The second problem with treating the principle of nonintervention as a rule is conceptual: whether one understands coercion
as turning upon the acting state’s intent or upon the effect on the
“victim” state, it can ultimately only be approached as a standard; and
while the domaine réservé has always been understood as inherently
evolutive, the related practice of the Security Council has made the
question of what constitutes a matter of international concern ever less
susceptible to rule-like analysis. This Section explores both of these
issues.
1. Coercion
Unlike under domestic US law, where the term has been much
discussed in the context of federalism, there is profound confusion
regarding how to unpack the international law concept of coercion. 106
Presumably, defining coercion as unlawful pressure would be
unhelpfully tautological. But if coercion is “compulsion”—in that

104. See G.A. Res. 3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
105. Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the “New International Economic
Order”: A Second Look at Some First Impressions, 16 VA. J. INTL L. 233, 237 n.21 (1976).
106. Kilovaty, supra note 3, at 168 (“[I]t is immensely difficult to define the boundary
between coercive and non-coercive actions.”); Detlev F. Vagts, Coercion and Foreign
Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 17, 28 (1978) (discussing coercion and stating
“[w]e find this body of law to be still in a primitive condition”); see, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Constitutional
Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1282, 1294 (2013) (distinguishing “coercion” from “compulsion”).
Compare, e.g., id. at 1331, with Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived
Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional
Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 503, 507 (2016); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 GEO. L. REV. 862
(2013).
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whether an action is coercive turns on its effect 107 – it would be very
hard to identify in a rule-like way.
To take a parallel example, the scholarship regarding the
prohibition of threats of force has suggested that what counts as a threat
will necessarily vary state-by-state. 108 Likewise, Article 18 of the draft
Articles on State Responsibility defines coercion as “conduct which
forces the will of the coerced State . . . giving it no effective choice but
to comply.” 109 But what might leave one state no effective choice could
have little impact on another.
In general, this kind of effects test can only be applied in a
standard-like way. Take the international criminal law defense of
duress, which requires that an individual actually be coerced into taking
the action for which he or she seeks to avoid liability. 110 Without
wishing to engage the debate about whether duress is a justification or
107. Berman, supra note 106, at 1292 (Compulsion “is a description . . . of certain
circumstances of action, namely those in which, for one reason or another, our choices are very
substantially constrained.”).
108. Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 241 (1988) (discussing
the “subjective character of perceptions of threat”); id. at 245 (arguing that how a real a threat is
“depends on the target’s rational or irrational belief system”); FRANCIS GRIMAL, THREATS OF
FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STRATEGY 46 (2013) (“For a threat to be effective, the
‘target’ state must perceive the action as a threat. This in turn depends on the target’s rational or
irrational belief system.”); Mohamed Helal, Of Fire and Fury: The Threat of Force and the
Korean Missile Crisis, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 30, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/30/of-fireand-fury-the-threat-of-force-and-the-korean-missile-crisis
[https://perma.cc/TY23-C8R6]
(“Determining the legality of threats of force will always depend on their political context and
strategic circumstances.”); cf. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 36, at 161 (“This does not . . .
imply that to be an intervention the interference must actually compel.”).
109. Int’l Law Comm., Draft Articles on State Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, at 69 (2001); see also James D. Fry, Coercion, Causation,
and the Fictional Elements of Indirect State Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANS’L L. 611, 619
(2007). Consider also Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
provides that a treaty is void if its conclusion was procured by the threat or use of force in
violation of international law. Scholars have argued that in order to assert that a treaty is invalid
on this basis, one must show that the illegal use of force caused agreement to the treaty. See
Michael Bothe, Consequences of the Prohibition of the Use of Force – Comments on Arts. 49
and 70 of the ILC’s 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 507 (1967), quoted in Stuart S.
Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, 7 CASE W. INT’L L. J. 4, 136 (1977).
110. Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1340 (1989); Sarah J. Heim, Note, The
Applicability of the Duress Defense to the Killing of Innocent Persons by Civilians, 46 CORNELL
INT’L L. J. 165, 170 (2013) (discussing Nuremberg requirement that the defendant have
“performed the coerced act against his will”); cf. Benjanmin J. Risacher, Note, No Excuse: The
Failure of the ICC’s Article 41 ‘Duress’ Definition, 89 NOTRE. DAME L. REV. 1403, 1405 &
n.8, 1411 (2014) (praising an approach that “focuses on the individual and not the act”).
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excuse, suffice to say that it tends to be understood from the perspective
of the “reasonable person” in the specific situation 111—a quintessential
standard. The same would have to be true were one to seek to
understand whether a state was “actually coerced.”
But perhaps the question is not the act’s effect, but the acting
state’s intent? 112 As indicated above, an intent test can be a rule.113 But
state intent is notoriously difficult to discern. 114 For that reason, those
that have sought to discern state intent in other contexts have relied
upon standard-like tests. 115
2. Domaine Réservé
A rule-like approach also fails to address the full complexity of
how to define the domaine réservé. It has been accepted since the
Permanent Court of Justice’s decision in the Nationality Cases that the
domaine réservé is variable based on a state’s international
obligations, 116 which necessarily means that its boundaries may differ
as between states and may change over time. However, at least those
metes and bounds could theoretically be discerned ex ante. The
problem is that there is a further complication having to do with the
interplay between the prohibition of state intervention and the specific
prohibition of intervention by the United Nations in Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter. 117
111. Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism and Proportionality: The Erdemovic
Case and Beyond, 41 VAND. J. TRANST’L L. 741, 756-57 (2008) (citing sources describing
reasonable expectations).
112. See supra Sectipn III.A; cf. Kunig, supra note 15, at ¶ 25 (“In order to determine
prohibited economic intervention, it can be of value to look [among other factors] at the
motivation of a State and identify the object of the State action.”). Of course, there could be
examples of actions that evince a potentially improper intent but are not ‘coercive’ – for instance,
espionage. Cf. Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J.
INT’L L. 291, 304 (2015).
113. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Eric Wyler, From ‘State Crime’ to ‘Serious Breaches of Obligations
Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law,’ 13 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 1147, 1150
(2002) (discussing “relinquishing the culpa of the culprit committing the wrongful act in favour
of a more objective defence of international ordre public”); cf. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The
Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity
under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203, 255 (1974) (discussing reasons not to read
Article 2(4) as concerning the intention of the acting state).
115. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Intention, Torture, and the Concept of State Crime, 114 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1, 25, 30 (2009) (“Objective state intent should hinge on social context.”).
116. Katja S. Ziegler, Domaine Réservé, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 2 (2013).
117. U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
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The latter explicitly includes an exception for “enforcement
action” taken by the Security Council. That is, Article 2(7) does not
preclude the United Nations from acting if either the matter is not one
essentially within states’ domestic jurisdiction or if the Security
Council is taking enforcement action. 118 The existence and interplay of
these two escape hatches has knock-on consequences for understanding
the domaine réservé.
Before the Council takes enforcement action, it must make a
predicate finding—that a threat to international peace and security
exists. 119 On this basis, one might take the view that the two exceptions
in fact collapse into one—that is, once the Council has determined that
a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, it is
necessarily no longer a matter of domestic concern. 120 However, the
suggestion that the use of the phrase “enforcement action” is
meaningless is not consistent with the negotiating history of Article
2(7). 121
At the same time, it also has to be right that where the Council has
made a threat determination, the situation is indeed no longer within
the domaine réservé of the relevant state. 122 One way to reconcile this
tension is to focus on the difference in how each escape hatch functions.

118. See Kristen Walker, An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as
an Embodiment of the Public/Private Distinction in International Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 173, 176, 178 (1994) (“[O]nly areas of activity not currently regulated by international law
fall within the reserved domain . . . Where a matter does fall outside the competence of the
United Nations, Article 2(7) arguably operates to preclude any United Nations actions with the
exception of discussion and Chapter VII enforcement actions.”).
119. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Introduction, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 1, 10 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
120. Cf. Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia,
and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 519, 524, n.23 (1994) (asserting that “domestic conflicts had
to be a threat to international peace before the Security Council could exercise jurisdiction”).
121. The original “four power” draft of what became Article 2(7) had proposed to except
actions the Security Council might take to respond to a threat to international peace and security.
This was, however, amended by Australia, which was concerned that the original formulation
would provide an incentive to create threats to international peace and security in order to allow
for the Security Council to pressure one’s adversary. Kawser Ahmed, The Domestic Jurisdiction
Clause in the United Nations Charter: A Historical View, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 175, 181
(2006); Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and
Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 519, 524, 538 n.103 (1994).
122. See also Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (1968) (“[O]nce
certain activities constitute a threat to international peace and security, they cease to be . . .
‘matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.’”).
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The exception for “enforcement action” fits the classical theology of
the prohibition of intervention—it focuses on a particular action taken.
The question of whether a matter is within a state’s domestic
jurisdiction—and, in particular, whether the Security Council deems it
so (evidenced at least in part by whether it makes a threat
determination) 123—functions differently. First, threat determinations
are case specific. As Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman said some
time ago, “the framers [] reject[ed] all proposed definitions of the key
terms [such as] “threat to the peace” . . . [leaving] the
Security Council. . . large freedom to make ad hoc determinations.”124
Second, the “situation” relevant to the determination of whether a threat
to international peace and security exists can be defined more or less
broadly. Thus, for instance, the Council has found that the humanitarian
situation in particular states is a threat to international peace and
security. 125 In the case of Syria, for instance, this was a clear choice, as
Russia did not want to suggest that the situation in Syria writ large was
a threat to international peace and security. 126 And third, as one author
has noted, once the Security Council deems that a threat to international
peace and security exists, it may act with respect even to matters that
would ordinarily not be of international concern. 127
This all suggests that the question of whether a matter is within a
state’s domestic jurisdiction does not turn only on whether
international law touches the particular matter, but also on an
increasingly nuanced understanding of particular facts and

123. Cf. supra note 119.
124. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 122, at 7. Cf. Gordon, supra note 120, at 549; id.
at 553; Jane E. Stromseth, Iraq’s Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses
and Continuing Challenges, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS 77, 87-88 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
125. The closest the Council may have come to relying solely on human rights as a basis
for finding a threat to international peace and security may be Haiti in 1994. See S.C. Res. 841
(June 16, 1993); see also Gordon, supra note 120, at 573.
126. See S.C. Res. 2165 (Jul. 14, 2014) (“Determining that the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Syria constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region”); cf. S.C. Res. 2118
(Sept. 21, 2013) (making a limited threat determination regarding the use of chemical weapons
in Syria).
127. See Gordon, supra note 120, at 525 n.33; JAMES COCKAYNE ET AL., THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND CIVIL WAR: FIRST INSIGHTS FROM A NEW DATASET 15
(2010) (“In the early 1990s, it [the Security Council] increasingly addressed governance and
internal political relations in civil-war-affected countries.”).
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circumstances128 – the antithesis of a rule. This sense, moreover, is not
limited to the idiosyncratic world of the Security Council. 129
C. Inconsistency with Recent Developments
The third problem is that recent developments have given the lie
to the notion that the prohibition of intervention is rule-like. Consider
for example the nostrum that elections are inherently sovereign.130
What then to make of the development around the world of provisions
regarding multilateral responses to interruptions of democracy? 131 In
the OAS, for instance, in 1992, states adopted the Washington Protocol,
which provides for the possibility of suspension from the organization
of a state the democratically elected government of which is
overthrown by force; 132 and in 2001, states adopted the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, 133 which covers a broader 134 set of interruptions
of the democratic order. 135
128. Consider also by analogy US practice regarding what constitutes a sufficient interest
to justify U.S. military action. The US Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has
suggested that humanitarian matters similar to those that have been deemed to constitute
potential threats to international peace and security may also qualify as sufficient such interests.
See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, April 2018 Airstrikes Against
Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, Slip Op. at 11 (May 31, 2018) (“In recent years, we have
also identified the U.S. interest in mitigating humanitarian disasters.”).
129. SIMMA, supra note 39, at 303 (describing “widespread agreement [regarding] the
powers of the UN organs . . . to initiate and undertake measures of conflict prevention outside
Chapter VII without violating Art. 2(7)”).
130. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
131. Cf. OAS Resolution on Venezuela Invalid, Says Top Venezuelan Official, XINHUA
(June
6,
2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/07/c_137237326.htm
[https://perma.cc/6MYZ-MLBT] (arguing that such provisions are inconsistent with the OAS
Charter itself).
132. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States,
opened for signature Dec. 14, 1992, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. 1005. The OAS also took diplomatic action
when democracy was interrupted even prior to adoption of this protocol, which suggests that it
is not sufficient to argue that states agreed to the protocol and therefore that actions under the
protocol cannot be intervention. For instance, in 1991 the OAS ad hoc Meeting of Consultation
recommended a range of diplomatic and economic measures against those involved in the coup
against Aristide. See Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test
of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 119, 132 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).,
133. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11,
2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289 (2001).
134. Ruben M. Perina, The Inter-American Democratic Charter: An Assessment and Ways
to Strengthen It, in BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE ROAD TO HEMISPHERIC COOPERATION:
BEYOND THE CARTAGENA SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS at 77, 80.
135. See Gurmendi, supra note 19 (noting that “[p]articipating in such a decision [under
the Democratic Charter] would unquestionably go against the spirit of the Estrada Doctrine, as
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Likewise, the United Nations, including the Security Council,
routinely engages on elections issues, 136 even when they have not
determined that a threat to international peace and security exists. For
instance, the Security Council has called upon Burundi to respect the
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 137 which was understood
as a demand that the President of Burundi not seek a third term, and
threatened sanctions. 138 The Security Council did this despite not
determining that the situation in Burundi constituted a threat to
international peace and security. Likewise, with respect to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Security Council has
underscored the need to abide by the DRC constitution in the holding
of elections. 139 And, indeed, during a recent Security Council debate,
China felt compelled to remind that “[they] see elections as a country’s
internal affair,” when other members raised concerns about voting
irregularities. 140 This all suggests either that what the UN is doing is
not “intervention” or that that elections are not necessarily a matter for
states themselves to decide under all circumstances (e.g., where there
is a risk of significant violence).
More broadly, another relatively recent development—the
emergence of what could be called “sticky consent”—is also hard to
square with a rule-like approach to the prohibition of intervention.
it specifically passes judgment on another state’s internal affairs”); see also Jacob P. Wobig,
Regional Regimes for the Defense of Democracy and Coups D’Etat, at 22-23 (May 19, 2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate College of the University of Nebraska) (canvassing
other examples), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1023&context=poliscitheses [https://perma.cc/E2F3-2WTL].
136. An early example is the Council’s reaction to the coup in Haiti in 1991. See S.C. Res.
841 (June 16, 1993).
137. See S.C. Res. 2248 (Nov. 12, 2015).
138. Id. at ¶ 6.
139. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Situation in
Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Press Release SC/12449-AFR/3414 (July 15, 2016);
see also President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2016/18 (Dec. 5, 2016) (expressing concern “about the risk of destabilization
for the country and the region . . . in the absence of a swift and consensual resolution to the
current political crisis”). Most recently, the Council sent a series of pointed messages in advance
of the December 2018 elections. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Press Release
SC/13632 (Dec. 18, 2018) (“The members of the Security Council reiterated their call on all
parties — Government and opposition — to engage peacefully and constructively in the electoral
process, in order to ensure transparent, peaceful and credible elections and to preserve peace and
stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.”).
140. See U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8452nd mtg. At 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8452 (Jan. 26,
2019).
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Consent is “sticky” where it is given in such a way that it cannot later
easily be retracted. The paradigmatic form of “sticky consent” is the
Security Council’s ability to authorize the use of force: by ratifying the
UN Charter, states consented in advance to accept any decision the
Council might take. 141
Sticky consent is growing more prevalent. During the Cold War,
some argued that even present consent could not render intervention
lawful (so-called “intervention by invitation”). 142 At a minimum, the
United States and others appear to have taken the view that a state could
not consent in advance to the use of force on its territory. 143 More
recently, however, not only has it become substantially clearer that—
at least from the perspective of state practice—consent is a sufficient
legal basis for what otherwise might be considered intervention, 144 but
states have also relied on ex ante consent to justify subsequent nonconsensual action. 145
141. See U.N. Charter art. 25.
142. See, e.g., Georg Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 2 (2010) (“[D]uring the early period of the Cold War (1947-1991),
a significant number of States considered that interventions at the invitation of the government
could violate the principles of non-intervention.”).
143. Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 74 AM. J INT’L L. 418, 419 (1980) (discussing the U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan
Treaty of Friendship and Soviet use of force); see also James P. Rowles, The United States, the
OAS, and the Dilemma of the Undesirable Regime, 13 GA. J INT’L & COMP. L. 385, 395-96
(1983); cf. Eliav Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in
Internal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT’L L. REV. 337, 371 (2011).
144. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 196, ¶ 43 (Dec. 19). For example, the United States
justified strikes against ISIS in Iraq by reference to Iraq’s consent. Cf. Dapo Akande & Zachary
Vermeer, The Airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and the Alleged Prohibition on Military
Assistance to Governments in Civil Wars, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/
the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-alleged-prohibition-on-military-assistanceto-governments-in-civil-wars [https://perma.cc/FW8B-WPNF].
145. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian Intervention: Giving
Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 CORNELL J. INT’L L. 499, 559 (2013) (“[B]y
signing a treaty of guarantee, a state agrees that any future intervention undertaken under the
treaty’s auspices would not violate its sovereignty.”); Peter E. Harrell Modern-Day Guarantee
Clauses and the Legal Authority of Multinational Organizations to Authorize the Use of Military
Force, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 417, 430 (2008) (“[P]rior agreement to the treaty trumps the state’s
current objection as long as the treaty is otherwise valid.”). This trend has been further facilitated
by changing interpretations of Article 53 of the UN Charter. Article 53 prohibits regional
organizations from undertaking “enforcement action” absent Security Council authorization. See
U.N. Charter art. 53. The classical view had been that – at a minimum – “enforcement action”
within the meaning of Article 53 included any use of force. See Marvin G. Goldman, Comment,
Action by the Organization of American States: When Is Security Council Authorization
Required Under Article 53 of the United Nationals Charter?, 10 UCLA L. REV. 837, 847-8
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For example, both the African Union and Economic Community
of West African States (“ECOWAS”) have treaty-given power to
authorize intervention, 146 and they have recently invoked or threatened
to invoke these authorities. In December 2015, the AU Peace and
Security Council (“PSC”) authorized an African Prevention and
Protection Mission in Burundi (“MAPROBU”) and indicated that if the
mission were not accepted by Burundi, the PSC would recommend that
the AU invoke Article 4(h) to permit it to act on Burundian territory
without consent. 147 The Security Council’s response did not question
the potential ability of the African Union to authorize such a mission.148
More significantly, ECOWAS actually authorized intervention in
Gambia in the wake of an effort by the then-President
unconstitutionally to retain power, 149 and the Security Council
welcomed this decision. 150
“Sticky consent” has also manifested itself in more subtle ways,
including with respect to peacekeeping operations. Originally,
peacekeeping missions were very explicitly understood as operating on
(1963). But it appears increasingly the case that states take the view that where there is a treaty
basis for action, there is no violation of Article 53 where a regional organization uses force
consistent with that treaty, on the (somewhat tautological but practical) logic that “enforcement
action” is limited to an action that would be unlawful absent Security Council authorization.
146. See Constitutive Act of the African Union [AU] art. 4(h); Economic Community of
West African States [ECOWAS], Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, art. 25 (1999). For a useful overview of
the provisions permitting intervention in Africa see generally Jeremy I. Levitt, Pro-Democratic
Intervention in Africa, 24 WIS. INT’L L. J. 785 (2006). The OAS also has authority to authorize
certain coercive measures, an authority which was relied upon for instance in the 1960s with
regard to Cuba and the Dominican Republic. See Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (“Rio Treaty”) arts. 6, 8.
147. African Union [AU], Communiqué of the 565th meeting of the PSC on the situation
in Burundi (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-565thmeeting-of-the-psc-on-the-situation-in-burundi [https://perma.cc/YL5T-3VY4].
148. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Situation in
Burundi, U.N. Press Release SC/12174-AFR /3293 (Dec. 19, 2015) (“The members of the
Security Council took note with interest of the decision by the African Union Peace and Security
Council to authorize the deployment of an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi
(MAPROBU) to address the situation in Burundi.”), available at http://www.un.org/press/
en/2015/sc12174.doc.htm.
149. Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], Final Communique of
the Fiftieth Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government (Dec.
17, 2016). This was authorization of non-consensual force since at the time the newly-elected
President had not assumed office (and so, regardless of one’s view on the question of whether
consent requires effective control of territory, was clearly unable to give consent).
150. S.C. Res. 2337, ¶ 4 (Jan. 19, 2017) (“[w]elcomes the decisions on the Gambia”). The
Council, was however, at pains to be clear that it was not itself authorizing the use of force.
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the basis of consent. 151 However, most contemporary peacekeeping
missions are authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the part
of the Charter concerned with uses of force). Why? One possibility is
that the Council is authorizing these missions to take actions the host
state could not themselves take (and therefore to which the state
arguably could not consent). 152 But assuming that is not the case, it
must be because the mission would have authority to continue
operations even were consent withdrawn. 153
The advent of “sticky consent’ has consequences for how we
should think about the prohibition of intervention. On one level, the
legality of intervention could still be rule-like insofar as the question
could be, “did the victim state consent by treaty to the acting state’s
intervention.” But even if that were the question, in order to answer it,
one would generally need to undertake a case-specific analysis of
whether the relevant treaty-based mechanism was appropriately
applied.154 So, for instance, that could mean determining whether war
crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity are occurring. 155 And that
question, in turn, may require the application of standards. For instance,
proportionality, which is key to many war crimes analyses, is a
151. See, e.g, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep.
170 (July 20) (“The verb ‘secure’ as applied to such matters as halting the movement of military
forces . . . might suggest measures of enforcement, were it not that the Force was to be set up
‘with the consent of the nations concerned.’”).
152. Cf. Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy,
54 HARV. J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (2013).
153. This is not unique to the context of peacekeeping operations. See, e.g., S.C. Res.
2387, ¶ 65 (Nov. 15, 2017) (authorizing French forces in the CAR); S.C. Res. 2364, ¶ 37 (Jun.
29, 2017) (authorizing French forces in Mali). In each case, France also enjoyed the consent of
the territorial state, but they nevertheless also sought Chapter VII authorization from the Security
Council.
154. For instance, in assessing the legality of US action in Grenada, Peter Harrell analyzed
whether the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States had grounds to order the use of force.
Harrell, supra note 145, at 437 (“The language of the OECS charter’s defense provisions . . .
simply did not authorize the use of force under the circumstances present in late 1983.”).
Likewise, what discussion there has been surrounding the Gambia has focused on ECOWAS’s
authority. See Elkanah Oluwapelumi Babatunde, ECOWAS and the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security: Protecting the Right to Democratic Governance, 6 U.
COLLEGE LONDON J. L. & JURIS. 46, 60 (2017). And the same was true of the AU PSC’s decision
regarding Burundi. See Solomon Dersso, World Peace Foundation, To Intervene or Not to
Intervene: An Inside View of the AU’s Decision-Making on Article 4(h) and Burundi, WORLD
PEACE FOUND. , (Feb. 2, 2016), https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/05/AU-Decision-Makingon-Burundi_Dersso.pdf [https://perma.cc/A86Z-J7Z7] (“[P]erhaps the most crucial [question]
was whether Burundi did indeed manifest the imminent danger of the occurrence of the grave
circumstances as envisaged under Article 4(h) of the [AU] Constitutive Act.”).
155. Cf. Constitutive Act of the African Union [AU] art. 4(h).
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standard, 156 and so is the requirement that an attack be widespread and
systematic in order to qualify as a crime against humanity. 157
V. CONCLUSION
Where then does this leave things? Is the prohibition of
intervention still meaningful? Is there any way to bridge the gap posited
in the Introduction to this Article between those who see the prohibition
as a rule and those who dismiss it as too vague to be of use? The answer
is a qualified “yes,” but that it has been much too ‘mythologized,’ to
use Louis Henkin’s apt description of sovereignty. 158
So much (in some cases well-deserved) ink has been spilled on
questions regarding the legality of forcible humanitarian
intervention 159 and re-conceptualizations of sovereignty. 160 However,
too little attention has been paid to the question of how these debates
should affect the broader understanding of the prohibition of
intervention. 161 If, for instance, sovereignty inheres (at least in part) in
the people, rather than their representatives (the state), is not the
question of what the state has the right to decide for itself necessarily a
more complicated one? 162 Likewise, if consent inoculates an action
from being considered intervention, should the democratic legitimacy

156. See Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 163, 187
(2011)
157. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
158. Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG
TIEYA 351 (Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994) (noting that “sovereignty has also spun a
mythology").
159. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53
HOUS. L. REV. 971, 1011 (2016).
160. Michael Reisman, for instance, argued in 1990 that sovereignty had become popular
sovereignty rather than state sovereignty. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990).
161. Cf. Niki Aloupi, The Right to Non-intervention and Non-interference, 4 CAMBRIDGE
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 566, 580 (2015) (“[I[t appears generally accepted-even if the debate is not
absolutely closed-that humanitarian interference . . . without any use of force and military
action . . . should be considered lawful under international law.”).
162. Cf. Tom J. Farer, Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States:
The Western Hemisphere’s Prospect, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 716, 721 (1993) (“Because the principle
of non-intervention draws its authority from the right of peoples to decide their own fate freely,
that right is obviously violated when the power to rule is violently appropriated.”); U.N. GAOR,
60th Sess., 68th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.68, (Dec. 22, 2005) (explanation of Vote by the
United States on resolution on sanctions) (“It is therefore a question not of so-called coercion
against developing countries, but of extending a hand of support to their peoples.”).
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of the government granting the consent matter? 163 That is, to return to
the exchange highlighted in the introduction, isn’t what was at issue in
the dispute between the US and Russia that deep question of whose
sovereignty matters for purposes of assessing whether an action is
intervention?
The first step toward articulating a modern approach to the nonintervention principle would be to reframe it as a standard. 164 So for
instance Ido Kilovaty suggests that whether a cyber intrusion
constitutes intervention should turn on the extent of its
disruptiveness. 165 Likewise, Rosalyn Higgins some time ago observed
that “one is dealing with a spectrum,” when it comes to
intervention. 166 This approach would be consistent with other areas
of law that have also wrestled with questions of effect and purpose.
Thus, for instance, the concept of abuse of rights 167 is generally
understood as a standard, turning upon reasonableness. 168
163. Cf. Karine Bannelier & Theodore Christakis, Under the UN Security Council’s
Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
855, 863 (2013) (discussing limits on intervention by invitation where it is designed to suppress
popular will); Gregory H. Fox, Intervention by Invitation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE
OF FORCE 816, 833 (Marc Weller ed., 2015) (discussing validity of intervention by invitation
based on democratic status of government); Roger Bond Choquette, Note, A Rebuttable
Presumption against Consensual Nondemocratic Intervention, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
138 (2016).
164. One the closest arguments to mine is that of Louis Sohn, who in a short piece in 1983
pointed out the various ‘gradations’ of kinds of intervention. See Louis B. Sohn, Gradations of
Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225 (1983). My argument is also
broadly consistent with those that have rejected a rigid, disaggregated understanding of
sovereignty. Compare Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1669 (2017) (arguing that sovereignty may protect a state from more than
is within the four corners of ‘intervention’), with Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Symposium on
Sovereignty, Cyberspace, and Tallinn Manual 2.0, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AMER.
J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 207, 208 (2017) (“Below these thresholds, there is insufficient evidence
of either state practice or opinio juris to support assertions that the principle of sovereignty
operates as an independent rule of customary international law that regulates states’ actions.”).
165. Kilovaty, supra note 3, at 172.
166. Rosalyn Higgins, 1 Themes and Theories: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Writings
in International Law 273 (2009).
167. Compare Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (2006), with Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A
New Age, 47 MCGILL L. J. 389, 389 (2002).
168. In the Conditions of Admission of a State to the United Nations case, the ICJ held that
the criteria laid down in the UN Charter for admission to the UN were exhaustive, but that
“Article 4 does not forbid the taking into account of any factor which it is possible reasonably
and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that Article.” Conditions of
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. Rep.
63 (May 28) (emphasis added). See also Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and

1200 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

One could of course argue that understanding non-intervention as
a standard will give greater leeway to states to intervene without
consequence (because violations of standards are harder to detect 169).
That is, however, a false choice. The more accurate choice is likely
between a standard and a prohibition that gradually falls into desuetude
because states cannot agree on its content. Moreover, articulating the
prohibition of intervention as a standard gives it at least a chance to
develop further.170
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest exactly what such
a standard might look like, but one fruitful area of exploration might be
to look to domestic law for inspiration. 171 Thus, for instance, in Lee v.
Weisman, the US Supreme Court framed the question of coercion as
turning on whether a student had “a reasonable perception that she
[wa]s being forced by the State to pray.” 172 Why not conceive coercion
as turning on reasonable state expectations? Or, taking it further, it
could perhaps turn on whether an action would unreasonably interfere
with the ordinary relationship between a state and its citizens. 173 Such
an approach might be a way to reimagine coercion in the age where
some postulate an international right to democratic governance.
Likewise, in thinking about public forum doctrine under the First
Amendment, Robert Post has argued against the concept of labeling
places on the basis of their historical usage (akin to how too often the
domaine réservé is conceived); instead, he favors looking to the
purpose for which the government uses a space. 174 A corollary might
be to think about the specifics of a particular area of government action
in qualifying it as a matter of domestic jurisdiction, or not. 175 These are

Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intention, 34 VAND. J. TRASNAT’L. L. 283,
330 (2001) (suggesting a standard-like test for assessing whether an action should be deemed to
defeat a treaty’s object and purpose).
169. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
170. Cf. Deeks, supra note 30, at 1045.
171. Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate
International Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1590-92 (2017).
172. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
173. Cf. Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of
American Federalism, 95 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2015).
174. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 171 (1996); Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1713, 1777 (1987).
175. Cf. Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State; Toward a New Paradigm
for International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 455 (1993).
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of course meant only as examples, and surely there are other fruitful
avenues of exploration in the domestic law of other states.
To be clear, this Article offers no brief for greater “intervention”
around the world. The Article takes no sides on the question of whether
particular interventions are or should be deemed lawful. Rather, it
simply has sought to urge a rethink of how to structure that debate.
Such a rethink might permit us to move past the tired debates about
whether discussion of human rights is intervention 176 (it is not) toward
an understanding of what kind of more limited constraints on state-tostate engagement should be deemed reasonable in today’s world.

176. Compare U.N. SCOR, 7926th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7926, (Apr. 18, 2017)
(describing human rights as a “back door for interfering in the internal affairs of States.”)
(statement of Egypt), with id. (Uruguay asserting that they did “not accept the excuse of
sovereignty or domestic jurisdiction in efforts to prevent the examination of the human rights
situation in Member States.”).

1202 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

